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Abstract 
Control Flow Errors have been widely addressed in 
literature as a possible threat to the dependability of 
computer systems, and many clever techniques have been 
proposed to detect and tolerate them. Nevertheless, it has 
never been discussed if the overheads introduced by many 
of these techniques ore justified by a reasonable probabilip 
of incurring Control Flow Errors. This paper presents a 
static executable code analysis methodology able to 
compute, depending on the torget microprocessor platform, 
the upper-boundprobability that o given application incurs 
in a Control Flow Error 
1 Introduction 
It is accepted that large software systems cannot he 
fault-free. Some faults may be attributed to inaccuracy 
during the development, while others can come from 
external causes such as environmental stress. 
Transient faults can cause abnormal behaviors of 
computer systems. Radiations, electromagnetic interference 
and power glitches are some of the causes of transient 
faults. For example, in radiation environment, alpha- 
particles, cosmic rays and solar wind flux can cause a single 
event upset (SEU), which causes the state of a memory cell 
or a sequential element (e.g., flip-flop) to change from 0 to 
1 or from 1 to 0. Recently, the problem is also concerning 
consumer products that, thanks to device geometries of 0.18 
Fm and helow operating at Vdd of 1.5 volts where less 
energy is required to change the state of each flip-flop and 
memory cell, are becoming highly susceptible to transient 
faults at the ground level. 
Fault may affect both data and code of the application. 
In any case, after a fault has accidentally occurred, the 
result of a program is unpredictable: for example, a desired 
function may not he executed, functions might not be 
performed in the right order, or the program crashes. 
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However, in many situations, the most deceptive event is 
when the program reaches the end producing a wrong 
answer which, unfottunately, looks reasonable; in this case, 
there is no way for the user to establish the reliability of the 
output. Unlike performance, the reliability of a computer 
system cannot be evaluated through the use of benchmark 
programs and standard test methodologies, only, but 
requires Observing the system behavior when a fault 
appears into the system. Since the MTBF (Mean Eme 
Between Failure) in a computer system can be of the order 
of years, fault occurrence has to he artificially accelerated 
in order to observe the system behavior under faults without 
waiting for the natural appearance of actual faults. In many 
cases. Fault Injection [ l ]  emerged as a viable and effective 
solution, and has been deeply investigated by both 
academia and industly [2], [3], [4]. For each Fault Injection 
experiment it is necessary to select a fault location, an 
injection time, a fault duration, and the input stimuli for the 
application. A Fault Injection campaign is able to 
characterize the application reliability only for a subset of 
its possible execution flows and therefore the “space” of 
possible faults and input stimuli makes the execution of a 
statistically significant number of experiments very 
difficult. 
In this paper we present a new methodology, named 
Fault Effect Analysis (FEA), able to characterize the 
probabilities of the possible behaviors of a given 
application affected by a transient fault in the code. The 
application code is not actually executed as in Fault 
Injection experiments, but statically analyzed. This makes 
possible to analyze all the possible execution paths at once, 
and allows obtaining more general results about the 
application reliability with a computational effort 
drastically lower than Fault Injection techniques. 
The proposed technique has been designed to analyze 
only the effects of faults appearing in the code of the 
application. The extension to data faults is under way, but 
out of the scope of this paper. 
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Experimental results have been obtained implementing a 
prototypical tool named FEAR (Fault Effect Analysis 
instRument), able to analyze the executable code of an 
application compiled for any platforms whose instruction 
set bas been described using an ad-hoc Instruction Set 
Description Language (ISDL). 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 points out 
the motivations behind our technique; Section 3 introduces 
the target fault model and Section 4 details the proposed 
Fault Effect Analysis. Section 5 discusses the main 
differences with Fault Injection techniques, Our prototype 
tool and some interesting experimental results are presented 
in Sections 6 and 7. Conclusions and future activities are 
summarized in Section 8. 
2 Motivations 
A correct control flow is a fundamental part of correct 
execution of computer programs. Generally, the techniques 
used to check the correct sequencing of the instructions 
(control-flow checking techniques) are based on Signature 
Analysis, in which a signature associated with a block of 
instructions is calculated and saved during compile time; 
then, the same signature is generated during m time and 
compared with the saved one. It has to be pointed out that 
most control-flow checking techniques are designed to 
detect illegal execution flows (i.e., execution flows not 
present in the application control-flow graph), but fail in 
detecting erroneous execution flows (e.g., a legal execution 
flow in which the wrong branch of an “ i f ”  instruction is 
executed). 
When the hardware design is fixed and cannot he 
changed, as in Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) based 
systems, control-flow error detection can only be achieved 
by pure software methods. Software Implemented 
Hardware Fault Tolerance (SIHFT) exploits pure software 
techniques to detect andlor tolerate faults appearing in the 
hardware. The main benefit of SIHFT is that it allows for 
improving the availability of the system without 
introducing any hardware overhead. Examples of software 
methods include assertions [5][6], watchdog task [6 ] ,  Block 
Signature Self-checking (BSSC) [7], Error Capturing 
Instructions (ECI) [7 ] ,  timers [XI, regular-expressions [9] ,  
Available Resource-driven Control-flow monitoring (ARC) 
[IO], temporal redundancy methods [Ill, and System Level 
Checks [12]. 
Both hardware- and software-based approaches usually 
introduce considerable overheads, especially in the system’s 
performances, that often make control flow checking 
techniques very difficult to be applied in real applications. 
Nevertheless, it bas never been carefully discussed if %e 
overheads introduced by control flow checking techniques 
are justified by a reasonable probability of incurring 
Control Flow Errors (CFE). 
We addressed this problem defining a new Fault Effect 
Analysis (FEA) methodology able to characterize, 
depending on the target microprocessor platform, the 
probabilities of the possible behaviors of a given 
application affected by a transient fault in the code. The 
proposed FEA is performed exhaustively considering SEU 
faults in every hit of the application code and of those data 
that may affect the application flow. The application code is 
not actually executed as in Fault Injection experiments, hut 
statically analyzed in order to compute the probabilities of 
the application’s possible behaviors. The goal of the 
presented technique is therefore to allow the software 
engineer to more deeply understand the possible behaviors 
and weaknesses of a software application whose code has 
been affected by a fault in the system hardware. 
3 Fault Model 
In this research we analyze errors caused by a single bit- 
flip, or SEU, appearing in the code of the target application. 
It is important to point out that we are interested only in the 
effect of the fault (i.e., the corruption of one or more 
instructions in the execution flow), and not in the physical 
location of the fault itself. Therefore, faults appearing in the 
code segment of the memory, in the system or internal 
buses, in the cache, or in the microprocessor fetch or 
decoding unit, are in our research functionally equivalent. 
the code of an application can be formalized as follows: 
The possible scenarios generated by a fault appearing in 
Misinterpretation of an insfmetion operand thc hit 
instruction is correctly interpreted, its length is 
unchanged, but the value of one of the instruction 
operands (e.g., Immediate Data, Register, 
Addressing mode, ...) is different. Figure la  shows 
an example of the consequences of an error 
affecting the interpretation of an instruction 
operand; 
Misinterpretation of a singk instruction: the fault 
transforms an instruction into another one of the 
same length; the following instructions remain 
untouched (Figure 1 b) and are correctly interpreted; 
Misinlerpretafion of a se1 of instructions: if the fault 
modifies a bit of a field whose value affects the 
instruction type and length, the error propagates 
along the following lines of code, causing a new 
and different sequence of instructions to be 
executed. 
In the following, we will refer to the sequence of 
misinterpreted instructions as Realignment Sequence. The 
Realignment Sequence can terminate either because one of 
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its instructions is illegal and therefore triggers an exception, 
or because, after a certain number of:instructions, the 
Instruction Pointer re-aligns to a legal instruction sequence. 
Figure IC  shows an example of a Realignment Sequence 
caused by a single hit error. 
Considering the mentioned scenarios, the possible fault 
Nlegul Instruction: the hit instruction or one 
instruction in the Realignment Sequence is illegal. 
The program is terminated hy an Illegal Instruction 
Exception; 
System Exception: the hit instruction and all the 
instructions in the Realignment Sequence are legal, 
hut one of them tries to perform an illegal operation 
(e.g., a division by zero, or an illegal memory 
reference). The program is terminated by a System 
Exception; 
effects can he grouped in the following termination events: 
UCCX 
Normul Termination (Undefined result): the hit 
instruction and all the instructions in the 
Realignment Sequence are legal, the Instruction 
Pointer re-aligns to the original sequence, and the 
program terminates normally. 
Whereas the first two cases are less critical since the 
error is detected by the system, the last case is in many 
cases the most feared one, since ,the error is not detected 
and there is no way of guaranteeing the.correctness of the 
results. If the result is faulty, the situation is usually referred 
to as Fail Silent Violation, otherwise the fault is said to be 
Fail Silent. 
The main goal of the fault effect analysis presented in 
this paper is to analytically study the behavior of the target 
application when a fault appearing in the code does not lead 
to the triggering of an exception. 
CLC POP CX In AL,DX Cmp D1,SP CLC POP CX Call EFE5 
t n c m  CLC POP CX In AL,DX Cmp D1,SP CLC POD Cx Call EFE5 1 
tnE CX CLC POP CX In AL,DX Cmp D1,SP CLC 
b) A single instruction is misinterpreted 
POP CX Call EFES 
In< CX STC POP CX In AL,DX Cmp D1,SP CLC Pop CX Call E m 5  
Realignme2 Sequence 
c) A set of instructions is misinterpreted creation of a Realignment Sequence 
InE CX 
[7 Onginal code. 
0 Misinterpreted code (Realignment Sequence). 
Figure I :  Consequences of a single bit error on the instruction decoding. 
CLC Pop CX In AL,DX Cmp D1,SP CLC PO9 CX Call EPE5 
4 Fault Effect Analysis 
1nc cx 
A program can he considered as a sequence of 
instructions. and the execution of the urogram can be 
MOV t88171, AX OUT 59,AX Pop CX Call EFE5 
. _  
viewed as executing instructions .in a desired sequence. 
Inside this sequence a basic block can he defined as a set of 
instructions without any branching inside or outside except 
Before detailing the proposed Fault Effect Analysis we 
introduce some hasic definitions needed to clarify the 
following concepts. 
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for the last one. Using the concept of basic blocks, a 
program can be therefore associated to a Control Flow 
Graph, which consists of basic blocks and directed edges 
connecting basic blocks, and which represents all the 
possible and legal execution flows of the target application. 
Each execution of the program can he mapped in one visit 
of the graph. A Control Flow Error (CFE) occurs when the 
execution flow does not match any legal traversing of the 
control flow graph. We call Control Block Errors (CBE), 
those errors that modify one instruction either into another 
instruction or into a Realignment Sequence without 
modifying the program control flow. All Control Flow 
checking techniques mentioned in the introduction aim at 
reducing the number of Fail Silent Violations caused by 
Coutrol Flow Errors (i.e., the execution flows that reach the 
Normal Termination following an illegal flow of operations 
and producing incorrect results). 
To assess the probability of a Fail Silent Violation 
caused by a CFE, we have to deeply analyze the 
consequences an error can have on the program flow. To do 
so, we statically perform an FEA on the application 
executable code. 
The execution flow.of an application is determined by 
control flow instructions like jump, call, or rets. From now 
on we will refer to this type of instructions as jump 
instructions. There are direct jumps, where the destination 
address is fixed and expressed as immediate data, and 
indirect jumps, where the destination address is contained 
in a register, in the data memory, or in the stack. 
The jump instructions determine the program flow and, 
in general, if an error involves a jump instruction we have a 
CFE and, potentially, a Fail Silent Wolation. There are in 
fact two possibilities: 
The error causes the misinterpretation of a jump 
instruction in the original code sequence. 
A new jump instruction is erroneously interpreted in 
the hit instruction or in the Realignment Sequence. 
Figure 2 presents the Control Flow Analysis performed 
to obtain the results that will be presented in Section 7. 
Illegal 
nstruction 
i 0 
Legal 
Instruction 
Outside the Inside the 
0 
Figure 2: FEA on theprogramflow, 
instruction ( I ) ,  a legal misinterpretation of the current 
instruction (2), or the same instruction, due to donl care 
bits in the instruction opcode. In the latter case, the 
behavior is classified as a Fail Silent (FS) (T5). Whereas 
In the analysis tree showed in Figure 2, the effect of a 
SEU can evolve into one of the ierminaiion events 
described before in Section 3. After its appearance, a SEU 
can transform the affected instruction in an illegal 
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the first case will trigger an illegal exception (TI), in the 
second case, if the hit instruction is interpreted as a jump 
(3), it can cause a direct jump (4) or an indirect one (5) .  In 
the first case (4), since the destination address is contained 
in the code as an immediate field, it is possible to follow the 
program flow. There are two possibilities: . The destination address points to a byte internal to 
the program code (6): in this case, it is possible to 
continue the analysis starting from the destination 
address. Since the destination address not 
necessarily points to the first byte of an instruction, 
a Realignment Sequence could he started (7). 
The destination address points to a byte external to 
the program code (8): in this case, the Instruction 
Pointer will he driven in a portion of the memory 
outside the program, and it is not possible to 
continue the analysis. Usually the access to the 
external memory address is detected and a 
processor exception occurs (T2). 
If the hit instruction is misinterpreted as an indirect jump 
(9, it is impossible to discover the destination address, 
since it will depend on data related to the program 
execution in the moment of the error. In this case, if the size 
of the register containing the destination address (MD) and 
the dimension of the program code (CD) are known, it is 
possible to calculate the probability of jumping inside the 
code (Internu/ Jumping Probobilify, IJP). The IJP is given 
by the following expression: 
CD IJP = - 
2 m  
Given the IJP, it is possible to continue the analysis. 
Nevertheless, in this case it is not possible to know the 
destination address and it is therefore not possible to 
continue the analysis on a particular Realignment 
Sequence. We analyze the entire application code and 
decode all the possible Realignment Sequences starting 
from each byte of the code. With this information we can 
compute a general probability of reaching the termination 
events TI and T4 for an indirect jump instruction inside the 
code segment. 
When the hit instruction is not reinterpreted as a jump 
instruction, a Realignment Sequence is started (9); the 
following four situations are possible: 
The Realignment Sequence ends because the 
Instruction Pointer realigned to the original code 
(11): in this case the program flow returns on a 
valid sequence, hut a different set of instructions 
(the Realignment Sequence) has been executed 
instead of the expected one: the program result is 
unpredictable (T3). This is the termination event 
that includes the CFEs that might cause a Fail Silent 
Violation (T4) and that are the real target of the 
Control Flow Checking techniques referred to in the 
introduction. The proposed control flow analysis 
distinguish the upper-hound probability of incurring 
in CFEs and CBEs, thus giving the software 
engineer a mean to evaluate the trade-off between 
overheads introduced by Control-Flow-Checking 
techniques and the gained dependability of the 
system; 
A jump instruction is found before the end of the 
Realignment Sequence (12). In this case, the 
behavior depends on the type of jump, and the 
analysis continues as described before; 
An illegal instruction is detected before either the 
realignment of the Realignment Sequence or the 
decoding of a ‘>ump” instruction (13). In this case 
the system triggers an illegal exception (Tl); 
An illegal operation is performed by one legal 
instruction of the Realignment Sequence (14) (e.g., 
a division by zero, or an instruction addressing 
memoiy areas outside the application scope); a 
System exception is triggered (T2). 
The analysis also takes into account that a jump 
instruction may be unconditioned (the jump always occurs), 
or conditioned (the value of a flag determines if the jump is 
taken). In the first case the analysis has to simply follow the 
appropriate arrow of Figure 2. In the second case, where the 
jump is taken depending on run-time data not directly 
obtainable in the code, a jumping probability is computed. 
Since the jump condition is usually determined by binary 
flags, we considered a 50% probability of taking the jump 
when a conditional jump is encountered. In this case, the 
analysis continues following both branches and considering 
their execution with a halved probability. We know that this 
might he a limitation of our approach, because during the 
application execution the probabilities of each branch are 
likely not to be the same. 
5 A-FEA vs Fault Injection 
The results calculated by the proposed analysis can be 
very different from the ones obtained using traditional 
dependability evaluation techniques. In Fault Injection, 
each experiment requires to select a fault model (location, 
injection time, duration), and a set of input data for the 
application. It is not obvious that the chosen input data will 
traverse all the possible application execution flows. 
Therefore a Fault Injection campaign is able to characterize 
the application reliability only for a subset of its possible 
execution flows and therefore the “space” of possible faults 
and input stimuli makes the execution of a statistically 
significant number of experiments very difficult. 
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We can explain the difference with the f.)llowing 
example. Let's consider an application with the cnnirol flow 
graph presented in Figure 3, and let's assume to define a 
Fault Injection campaign injecting 1,000 random faults in 
the code segment of the application with a set of input 
stimuli that will cause the application to execute the 
following flow: Begin-A-End. Since the block B of 
instructions is never executed, at the end of the campaign 
we can expect all the faults injected in B (-50%) to be Fail 
Silent. 
On the contrary, the proposed A-FEA will analyze all the 
possible execution flows,. providing at the end of the 
analysis a probabilistic figure of the possible behaviors of 
the application considering the probability of executing 
each of the branches equal to 0,s. 
Figure 3: FEA on theprogramflow 
6 Tool 
The fault effect analysis methodology presented in the 
previous section is being automated in FEAR (Fault Effect 
Analysis instRument). As shown in Figure 4, FEAR reads 
the application executable code, and an ISDL file 
containing the detailed description of the instruction set of 
the target processor. The ISDL file is divided in hvo parts, 
one describing the instruction's general format, and the 
other listing all the instructions implemented in the target 
microprocessor. The executable file has to be compiled for 
the same processor described in the ISDL tile. This feature 
will allow us to evaluate whether or not the FEA is affected 
by the instruction set format. We currently described in OUT 
ISDL the Intel IA-32 (CISC) instruction set, which includes 
all the instructions from the Intel 286 to the Pentium III 
processor, and the SPARC V (RISC) instruction set. 
Figure 4: FEAR Input/Outputfiles 
FEAR generates two output files: 
The A-FEA is the most important file and stores the 
SEU effect analysis performed on the application 
executable code. This file stores the probabilities of 
each termination event for the considered 
application. 
The CFL file contains the list of locations in the 
program code or variables where a SEU produces 
an undefined effect w.r.t. the program flow. This 
list can be used to generate a reduced fault list to he 
used in a Fault Injection aiming at more deeply 
understanding the behavior of the application under 
the occurrence of SEU faults. 
In the current version of FEAR, we are not able to deal 
with dynamic libraries like dlls. To perform the following 
experiments we solved the problem by generating 
executables files including all the required libraries. 
7 Experimental Results 
The experimental results presented in this Section have 
been obtained by running FEAR on two SPEC benchmarks 
(www.suec.org). The first, Dryston, is a mathematical 
benchmark working on integer numbers. The second, EON, 
is a 3D studio rendering engine. 
We present two sets of experimental results. The first 
reports the results of the A-FEA on the two benchmarks 
compiled for the lntel Pentium instruction set. The second 
highlights the differences between RlSC and CISC 
instruction sets by comparing the A-FEA run on the two 
benchmarks compiled for both Intel Pentium and Sun Sparc 
architectures. 
In analyzing the presented results, some additional 
considerations have to be done: 
The analysis assumes that the SEU occurrence 
probability is equal to 100%. In a real case, this 
probability depends on the technology, on the 
working environment (space, ground level, etc), and 
on the ratio between the code size and the overall 
system memory. 
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The analysis also assumes that each SEU is always 
activated; nevertheless, in a real execution, many 
parts of the program are never be executed or are 
executed for the last time before the SEU 
appearance. Therefore, a'SEU in one of these parts 
does not affect the correctness of the program. 
7.1 A-FEA for Intel Pentium 
The tint set of experimental results concerns the 
probabilistic distribution of the termination events, 
computed applying the A-FEA described in Section 4. 
Besides the termination events previously introduced, the 
tool stops the analysis when the SEU effect causes an 
infinite loop in the application flow. The termination event 
probabilities for the two benchmarks compiled for the Intel 
Pentium instruction set are reported in Table 1 (the 
termination event code introduced in Section 4 is reported 
in brackets). 
Table I :  Termination Events Probability 
Let's comment separately the result of each termination 
Illegal ( T I ) :  the percentage of illegal instructions is 
quite low. This result strongly depends on the used 
instruction set. The IntePPentium instruction set has 
many don't care bits in the instruction opcodes, and 
therefore many SEUs are Fail Silent. 
Data fault (T2): both benchmarks showed a high 
percentage of data faults, i.e., possible accesses to 
memory locations outside the data segment. The 
result is particularly high because the probability of 
having into a Realignment Sequence an instruction 
accessing the memory is very high. Being in a 
Realignment Sequence, the memory address is 
unknown (or random). We computed the probability 
where 
DS 
of having a legal memory access as - 
2m 
MD is the size of the register containing the 
memory address and DS the dimension of the data 
segment. This probability depends on the target 
processor, the application itself, and the operating 
system. In our experiment setup the probability is 
very low and therefore the Data fault probability 
very high. 
event: 
Jump Outside (T2): the probability of having a jump 
instruction in a Realignment Sequence is much 
lower than the probability of having a random 
memory access. Therefore, the probability of 
jumping outside is quite low. 
Fail Silent (T3): a fault is Fail Silent if it doesn't 
cause any error. This can happen when injecting a 
fault into a don't care hit, or into padding bytes, 
never executed by the application. 
CBE (T3): a fault causes a CBE when the flow 
within a basic block is affected, but the global 
execution flow is still legal. This class of errors is 
very difficult to detect using traditional control-flow 
error techniques. The results in Table 1 show that 
this is a very critical class of errors that can lead to 
unpredictable results. 
CFE (T4): one of the most interesting results is the 
low percentage of CFE (1,7% and 1,6%). This 
result seems to point out that CFEs have to be 
targeted only when very high reliability is required. 
In all other cases, other classes of errors should be 
addressed first. 
7.2 A-FEA in RISC and CISC 
Table 2 and 3 present a comparison obtained running the 
A-FEA on the two benchmarks compiled for CISC and 
RISC (Sun Sparc) instruction sets. Results show that the 
application behavior (and therefore dependability) is 
strongly related to the instruction set implemented by the 
target platform. The most interesting difference in the A- 
FEA analysis is that a fault into a RISC application never 
produces a Realignment Sequence. 
I I C B . / R B . I  
CBE (r3) 
CFE (r4) 
Loops 
Table 2: Termination Events Pmbabilities in CISC and 
RISC architectures for  the Drystone benchmark 
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8 Conclusions and future work 
In this paper.we presented a Fault Effect Analysis (FEA) 
methodology, aimed. at : characterizing the behavior of a 
target application wXen~a!SEU occurs in its code segment. 
The FEA worksstatically. on the application code without 
actually executing.tXe application, but only prohahilistically 
following all its possihle.flows. This and other significant 
differences betweeni ttie proposed technique and other 
dependability evaluation techniques like Fault Injection 
have been discussed.. We presented several experimental 
results obtained running FEA on two complex benchmarks 
compiled for a CISC and a RISC instruction set. Some 
results showed a considerable difference between RISC and 
Table 3: Termination Events Probabilities in CISC and 
RISC architectures for the EON benchmark 
In the following we analyze each class separately: 
Illegal (TI): the number of faults generating an 
illegal instruction exception is higher in the RISC 
architecture because of the different coding scheme 
of the instruction set. 
Datafault (T2): the number of Data faults is lower 
in the RISC architecture hecause the RISC 
instruction set privileges the use of registers instead 
of memory locations. Moreover, realignment 
sequences are never generated in a RISC 
architecture, and therefore the probability of having 
a fault generating a memory access instruction is 
lower than for the CISC architecture. 
Jump Outside (rz): as for the CISC, also for the 
RISC Instruction set the percentage of Jump 
Outside seems more related to the instruction set 
structure than to the application itself. 
~~ ~ ~~ 
CISC machines, suggesting that the choice of the target 
instruction set can he an important parameter that can 
contribute to the overall system dependability. 
Our future activities are focused on the refinement of the 
technique and in particular in: 
defining a method to evaluate the different 
execution flows, in order to weight our results with 
their actual execution probability. 
extending the analysis to other instruction sets in 
order to more deeply investigate their correlation 
with the system overall dependability and, in the 
long run, to propose a new dependability-oriented 
instruction set. 
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